China’s Belt and Road strategy is consolidating control over critical minerals not at the pit but along export corridors, exemplified by the US$20 billion Simandou joint venture that couples a multi‑hundred‑kilometre heavy‑haul railway with the new deep‑water port of Morabaya to channel Guinean iron ore directly to Chinese industry. In Africa’s Copperbelt, where 15% of global copper reserves and most known cobalt resources sit thousands of kilometres from deep‑water ports, foreign‑financed rail and terminals effectively dictate whether concentrates move as raw exports or into local refining. Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port, 85% funded by China and offering deep‑water berths suitable for naval deployment, illustrates how dual‑use port ownership can weaponise logistics and blunt resource‑nationalist policies such as export bans on unprocessed lithium, graphite, copper and cobalt.

The Minerals Council of Australia is urging the Federal Government to suspend 25 July changes to skilled migration rules that prioritise onshore visa applicants over offshore candidates. MCA warns the shift will delay recruitment of critical roles such as mining engineers, geologists and diesel fitters, particularly for remote operations where local labour is already tight. Companies may face longer lead times to staff projects, constraining productivity gains and potentially slowing brownfield expansions and maintenance-intensive fleets.

The UK government has opened applications for its £25 million Critical Minerals Accelerator, offering grants of £150,000–£3 million to late-stage extraction, processing and recycling projects expected to reach commercial operation by March 2030. The scheme forms half of the £50 million Critical Minerals Programme and sits alongside a new Magnet Hub for rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing and a Demand Aggregation Platform to consolidate offtake. Policy targets include meeting 30% of domestic critical mineral demand by 2035 and reducing exposure to overseas supply chains.